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FDA Preemption of State Tort Law in
Drug Regulation: Finding the Sweet
Spot
Peter H. Schuck*

Consider this all-too common scenario. A drug manufacturer
develops a new product and proceeds to spend hundreds of
millions of dollars in order to satisfy the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) that the drug is safe and effective within
the meaning of the 1962 Drug Amendments I to the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). 2 After the FDA spends many years
analyzing these data, including commissioning a scientific review
by outside experts and holding a public hearing before an advisory
committee, it finally permits the company to market the drug
under a carefully formulated label that describes the drug's uses,
risks, proper dosages, and other limiting conditions. A consumer
of the drug later becomes ill and sues the manufacturer for
damages. She alleges that the drug is defective and that its
labeling and advertising are false or misleading. Both the drug
and the label comply with all of the FDA's rules. No new risks
have come to the attention of the manufacturer or the FDA-or if
they have, the manufacturer has notified the FDA and the agency
has taken no further regulatory action. A jury finds the company
* Simeon E. Baldwin Professor, Yale Law School. Richard Epstein, Mark
Geistfeld, Peter Barton Hutt, David Levy, Jerry Mashaw, Thomas Merrill,
Robert Rabin, David Shapiro, Catherine Sharkey, Stephen Sugarman, and
Benjamin Zipursky generously commented on earlier drafts.
Krishanti
Vignarajah, Yale Law School Class of 2008, provided excellent research
assistance.
1. Drug Amendments Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780
(1962).
2. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2001-2006).
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liable for large compensatory and punitive damages. A month
later, another jury in a different state dismisses an essentially
identical claim, upholding both the drug and its label.
What is wrong with this picture? Legally, nothing. State tort
law allows juries to consider or ignore FDA approval, substitute
their own judgment on whether the product is unsafe and
improperly labeled, and award tort damages that are subject only
to the loosest legal limits and a patchwork of hit-or-miss tort
reform efforts. Michigan alone provides for a complete regulatory
compliance defense, subject only to a fraud-on-the-agency
exception; 3 a handful of other states offer manufacturers various
forms of more limited protection. 4 Except in Michigan, a drug

3.

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.

4.

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.

§ 600.2946(5) (2000).
§

13-21-403(1)(b) (2007) (rebuttable

presumption that product is not defective if it complied with a code, standard,
or regulation promulgated by an agency of the United States or this state at
the time of sale); IND. CODE § 34-20-5-1(2) (1999) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 603304(a) (2005) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 2000) (rebuttable
presumption that a warning or instruction given in connection with a drug or
device is adequate if approved or prescribed by the FDA); TENN. CODE ANN. §
29-28-104 (2000) (rebuttable presumption that product is not unreasonably
dangerous if manufacturer or seller complied with "any federal or state
statute or administrative regulation . . . prescribing standards for design,
inspection, testing, manufacture, labeling, warning or instructions" at the
time product was manufactured); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §
82.007(a)(1) (Vernon 2005) (rebuttable presumption that defendant is not
liable for failure to provide adequate warnings or information regarding a
pharmaceutical product if such warnings or information were approved by
the FDA); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (2002) (rebuttable presumption that
product is not defective if it was "in conformity with government standards
established for that industry which were in existence at the time . . . the
product [was] adopted"). For limits on punitive damages, see ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-701(a)(1) (2003) (manufacturer or seller of a drug is not liable for
punitive damages if drug "[w]as manufactured and labeled in relevant and
material respects in accordance with the terms of an approval or license
issued by the [FDA]"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5(c) (West 2000) (punitive
damages not permitted if drug was subject to premarket approval by the FDA
and was approved, unless the manufacturer of such drug "knowlingly
withheld or misrepresented information required to be submitted under the
[FDA's] regulations"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(6) (1996) (punitive
damages not permitted if product complied with federal statutes,
administrative regulations, or premarket approval or certification by a
federal agency); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(C)(1) (West Supp. 2007)
(manufacturer or seller of drug not liable for punitive damages if drug "was
manufactured and labeled in relevant and material respects in accordance
with the terms of an approval or license issued by the [FDA]"); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 30.927(1)(a) (2005) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2(1)(a) (2002) (punitive
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company's full and continuing compliance with FDA requirements
provides no safe harbor against tort liability. Instead, the law
casts the manufacturer onto the stormy sea of litigation where a
jury may, if it wishes, treat the FDA's laborious approval process
as authoritative, entirely irrelevant, or something in between.
The project of harmonizing tort law and regulatory law in the
public interest-the "sweet spot" of my subtitle-is inherently
fraught with difficulty. This, of course, is a very old problem for
American law generally. Our administrative state began during
Beacause energetic
the first decade of the Republic. 5
administration has always created risks of harm to persons and
property, the potential for overlap and conflict with the hoary
common law of torts. which likewise protects persons and
property, has always been an inevitable consequence of regulatory
Moreover, as Richard Nagareda explains, recent
statutes.
developments in both tort law and administrative regulation
"increasingly cast the two less as complementary regimes than as
6
institutional rivals."
The potential conflicts between administrative regulation and
tort law extend well beyond the problem of overlap; they inhere in
the competing purposes and the different institutions and
processes of tort and regulation. 7 Whether scholars define tort
law as a vehicle of corrective justice, 8 an engine of deterrence, 9 or

damages not permitted if drug "received premarket approval or licensure by
the [FDA]").
5. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law:
Federalist Foundations 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256 (2006); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists:FederalAdministration and Administrative
Law in the Republican Era, 1801-1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636 (2007).
6. Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the
Administrative State, 1 J. TORT L. art. 4, 3 (2006), http://www.bepress.com/j
tl/voll/issl/art4.
7. Tort law, particularly in its pursuit of deterrence, obviously has
significant regulatory effects. For an analysis of how the Supreme Court has
treated this fact, see Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption:
An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008)
[hereinafter Sharkey, Institutional Approach] (noting that the Court has
oscillated between the "competing conceptions" of tort as regulatory or
compensatory, with preemption following the regulatory view, and nonpreemption following the compensatory view).
8. The most thoroughgoing and rigorous advocate of this conception is
Ernest Weinrib. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995);
Symposium, Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care One Owes One's
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something else, they agree that compensation of victims is a
central, perhaps essential, element. They may hotly debate the
appropriate measure of losses and the issue of who should
properly bear them in which proportions, but all concur that tort
law is concerned with the repair of victims' harms. In contrast,
administrative regulation seeks to achieve specific social purposes
through a public agency that typically deploys rulemaking,
adjudication, informal guidance, subsidies, taxes, research,
information, and a variety of other instruments. Its regulatory
toolkit, however, only seldom includes compensation for the
10
victims of conduct that violates the agency's rules.
The doctrines governing federal regulatory preemption are
meant to harmonize potential conflicts between (1) statutory
schemes designed to regulate the behavior of firms and other
actors largely through antecedent rules, and (2) tort law's use of
retrospective, case-by-case
common law adjudication to
compensate victims while also deterring (and hence regulating)
those same actors. Sometimes, policymakers make this difference
explicit, as when Congress enacted the Airline Stabilization Act of
2001, which created a special agency to compensate the victims of
the September 11 tragedies and preempted tort litigation
against the airline industry by those victims who accepted the
compensation, and limited tort claims in certain ways by those
who did not.'1 In other cases, the statutes creating agencies
expressly preserve, prohibit, or modify victims' tort law
remedies.1 2 In still others, the statute is silent or (what may have
the same legal effect) sufficiently ambiguous on the questions of
whether and to what extent tort remedies are preempted 13 that
Neighbors, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992).
9. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 208-09 (1981).
10. The implications of this distinction for preemption are further
discussed in the Conclusion.
11. See KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT is LIFE WORTH?:
UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 (2005).

12.

THE

E.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 515, 521-31

(1992) (holding that express preemption clause stating "[n]o requirement or
prohibition . . . shall be imposed under [sitate law with respect to the

advertising and promotion of any cigarettes . . .labeled in conformity with
the provisions of this Act" preempts certain state common law actions).
13. E.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 681
(2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[G]iven the foregoing discussion of the text
of the Medicaid Act, it cannot be read to unambiguously prohibit Maine Rx,
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the courts must resolve these questions using standard
14
interpretive techniques.
It is these latter instances of silence or significant ambiguity
preemption (hereafter
the federal regulatory
concerning
"preemption") question with which this Article is concerned.' 5 My
discussion specifically concerns the FDA's regulation of
16
pharmaceutical drugs for safety and efficacy, but my argument
would also be relevant, mutatis mutandis, to other areas of federal
policy in which, absent an express preemption provision, a federal
agency exercises comprehensive regulatory authority over an
industry and sets optimal safety standards, rather than minimal
safety standards. 17 By "optimal," I mean the socially best balance
or indicate that Congress, in enacting § 1396a(a)(19), directly addressed this
issue.").
14. See, e.g., Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 7 (discussing
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Medtronic v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470 (1996); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002); and Bates
v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005)).
15. I am not concerned here with state statutes or common law rules that
may preempt tort liability as a matter of state statutory or common law.
That kind of preemption occurs when, and to the extent that, state law
provides a regulatory compliance defense to tort liability. Although my
argument for qualified FDA regulatory preemption implies the desirability of
a pro tanto defense under state law-and, if such a defense were adopted,
would compel state courts to adopt it-the fact that few states now provide
one means that the issue is best discussed under the rubric of preemption
The distinction between
rather than a regulatory compliance defense.
preemption and a regulatory compliance defense is discussed at greater
length in Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory
Preemption in PharmaceuticalCases in State Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L.
& POL'Y 1013 (2007) [hereinafter Sharkey, Federalism in Action].
16. The relationship between safety and efficacy is explored in Anita
Bernstein, Enhancing Drug Effectiveness and Efficacy Through Personal
Injury Litigation, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 1051 (2007). She does not focus on the
preemption issue with respect to either, but seems to envision a large role for
state tort litigation. Id. at 1074-98 (advocating that plaintiffs who suffer
drug-caused harms should have claims based on drug effectiveness as well as
drug safety).
17. The proposition that FDA regulation has these features is discussed
in Nagareda, supra note 6, at 2, 5, 36-37, 53; id. at 26-28 (discussing the
FDA's periodic reviews of whether the antidepressant SSRI caused the
emergence of suicidal thoughts); Sharkey, InstitutionalApproach, supra note
7; Sharkey, Federalism in Action, supra note 15, at 1026-27. The National
Highway Traffic Safety Agency and the Consumer Product Safety
Commission have asserted that they too can preempt state tort law by
preamble. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal
Agencies and the Federalizationof Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 230-37
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between safety, effectiveness, cost, and other relevant factors,
taking into account that some individual users may be harmed
even under such a standard.
When these comprehensive regulatory and optimal safety
conditions are satisfied, as I believe is true of the FDA's regulation
of drug safety, 18 state tort judgments that penalize manufacturers
for not meeting different standards are more than simply
compensatory; rather, they are regulatory in every relevant sense
of the word. 19 The conflicting standards between state courts (and
juries) and the federal agencies create inconsistent incentives for
manufacturers. Insofar as such standards and incentives differ
from state to state-and sometimes differ from jury to jury within
a state-the inconsistencies are further magnified for
pharmaceuticals produced for national and global markets in
which the products' trans-jurisdictional uniformity is essential for
their economic efficiency. 2 0 Moreover, insofar as the uncertainty
arising from the prospect of liability under these varying state
laws inhibits manufacturers from investing in the development of
socially valuable pharmaceutical products, public safety may also
21
be adversely affected.
(2007) [hereinafter Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble]. In my view, however,
they lack the FDA's degree of regulatory comprehensiveness and goal of
optimal standard-setting.
18. There certainly are respectable arguments that the FDA does not
regulate for optimal safety, including court decisions and past statements by
the agency to that effect, statements that the agency recently seems to have
renounced. For discussion of this evolution, see Catherine M. Sharkey, The
Roberts Court Wades into Products Liability Preemption Waters: Reigel v.
Medtronic, Inc., 8 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST Soc'y PRAc. GROUPS, Oct. 2007, at 4,
7-8,
http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20071120_Engage8.4.pdf
[hereinafter
Sharkey, Roberts Court]. For reasons elaborated infra Part I, Congress
should remove any ambiguity on this score and affirm that optimal safety is
the criterion according to which the FDA's standards are to be set.
19. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1007-08 (2008)
(citing earlier Supreme Court decisions).
20. Many other commentators, including the Supreme Court in Buckman
Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 350-51 (2001), have
remarked on the seriousness of this structural conflict. For a contrary view,
see Levine v. Wyeth, No. 2004-384, 2006 WL 3041078,
21-28 (Vt. Oct. 27,
2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008) (finding that FDA labeling
requirements establish only a "floor" and that tort judgments setting a higher
standard are not regulatory).
21. Recent evidence suggests that manufacturer innovation processes
have bogged down. E.g., Stephanie Saul, Bristol-Myers to Eliminate 4,800
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Professor Tom Merrill notes that "[p]reemption is one of the
most widely applied doctrines in public law, yet it remains
' 22
Be that as it may-recent work
surprisingly under-analyzed.
authored by Merrill and Professor Catherine Sharkey have
2
certainly shrunk that deficit 3-the black-letter law of federal
24
If a federal statute
regulatory preemption is easily stated.
expressly or implicitly preempts state tort law-an issue of
statutory interpretation, except in the clearest cases-then the
finding of preemption is perfectly straightforward, although the
25
extent or domain of preemption may require further analysis.
Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007, at C1 (FDA approval rate for new molecular

entities-"drugs that are entirely new compounds rather than changes in
formulations"-declined by 18% in 2007 from 2006, is well below recent
norms, and is the lowest rate of FDA approvals since 1994).
22. Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U.
(forthcoming 2008).
REV.
L.
23. See, e.g., id. (advocating that absent congressional action courts are
best suited to decide questions of preemption and should "draw on the
expertise of agencies in helping to understand the pragmatic variables that
bear on the preemption decision"); Sharkey, Federalismin Action, supra note
15; Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 17; Sharkey, Roberts Court,
supra note 18 (anticipating that the Court's then-pending decision in Reigel
might clarify the level of deference courts should give to federal agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes on preemption issues); Catherine M.
Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter Sharkey, Fraud Caveat] (arguing that state
law fraud claims should be permitted against manufacturers in the event
that the FDA has made a prior finding of fraud-on-the-agency); Sharkey,
InstitutionalApproach, supra note 7 (advocating an agency reference model
in which courts defer to agencies in determining whether state common law
remedies are preempted when Congress "punts" on the issue). Merrill also
gives prominence to an earlier article, Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of
Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994). Merrill, supra note 22.
24. For an insightful case-by-case analysis of the doctrine's evolution and
current form, see Sharkey, InstitutionalApproach, supra note 7.
25. In the Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., for example, the Supreme
Court found it necessary to distinguish among different types of tort claims in
determining which were and were not preempted. See 505 U.S. 504, 530-31
(1992) ("[T]he 1969 Act pre-empts petitioner's claims based on a failure to
warn and the neutralization of federally mandated warnings to the extent
that those claims rely on omissions or inclusions in respondents' advertising
or promotions; the 1969 Act does not pre-empt petitioner's claims based on
express warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy.").
See also id. at 524-30 (discussing each of the claims); Riegel v. Medtronic,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (Medical Device Amendments of 1976 preempt
claims of strict liability, breach of implied warranty, and negligence); Bates v.
Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 434, 443-46, 452-53 (2005) (analyzing
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The courts have recognized two analytically distinct types of
implied preemption.
Conflict preemption occurs when the
demands of the regulatory scheme are inconsistent with the
demands of tort law-"where it is impossible for a private party to
comply with both state and federal requirements, or where state
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress. '26 Field preemption
occurs when Congress intends the regulatory scheme to "occupy
the field," supplanting any significant role for state law in that
27
regulatory domain.
Not surprisingly, the great difficulty arises not with these
broad preemption principles themselves, but rather with courts'
application of them in specific cases based on state tort law.
These difficulties are especially great, of course, in cases of
implied preemption. There, the court must perform at least the
following analyses: interpret the essential nature of the plaintiffs
claim; interpret the federal statute and any agency regulations
and other authoritative guidance that flesh out and gloss the
statute; determine how much Chevron, Skidmore, Mead, or some

other level of deference to accord to the agency's own
interpretations of these materials; 28 decide whether and how to
whether § 136v(b) of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
preempts common law claims of defective design, defective manufacturing,
negligent testing, breach of express warranty, fraud, and negligent failure to
warn).
26. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65 (2002) (citing
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)). Merrill notes that
the "frustration of purpose" species of implied preemption does not merely
trump state law (as conflict preemption does), but wholly displaces it in order
to effectuate federal policy. Merrill, supra note 22.
27. See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991)
("Congress' intent to supersede state law in a given area may nonetheless be
implicit if a scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it, if the Act of Congress ...touch[es] a field in which the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject . . ...
") (internal quotation

marks omitted).
28. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). This element includes the question of how much
deference, if any, the courts should accord to the FDA's assertion of its own
preemptive power, including the procedural preludes to such assertion. See
Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble,supra note 17, at 243-47.
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29
apply the commonly-cited presumption against preemption;
determine the scope, limitations of, and defenses to any
preemption that the court finds; allocate the burden of production
and proof regarding any such limitations and defenses; and make
(or instruct the jury to make) the findings of fact necessary to
apply these principles to plaintiffs claim. Given these multiple
occasions for a single court to exercise judgment in order to apply
indeterminate legal standards, the only predictable outcome, it
In fact,
seems, is that their decisions will be unpredictable.
unpredictability of outcomes is precisely what the case law
reveals. 30 This is particularly perverse in a policy domain in
which predictability is necessary to attract the immense
investments required for socially desirable drug research,
31
innovation, and marketing.
The question of how courts should apply preemption
principles to tort claims for alleged design and warning defects in
drug products regulated by the FDA lies at the intersection of tort
law, administrative law, and federalism law. Because the FDCA's

29. Merrill notes that this presumption "is honored as much in the
breach as in observance." Merrill, supra note 22. See also Sharkey,
Institutional Approach, supra note 7 (criticizing "the Court's haphazard
application of the presumption," most notably in implied preemption cases);
Sharkey, Roberts Court, supra note 18, at 5 (same).
30. See, e.g., Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 17, at 245-47
(noting a split among courts regarding "the level of deference to accord the
FDA's preemption preamble"); Sharkey, InstitutionalApproach, supra note 7
(noting that the Court itself has failed to consistently apply the presumption
against preemption); Sharkey, Roberts Court, supra note 18, at 5 (same); id.
at 4 (noting a split in the circuits on whether the FDA's premarket approval
process for medical devices preempts state common law tort actions). Merrill,
supra note 22 (noting the Supreme Court's conflicting propositions
concerning the deference courts are to give agencies on preemption
questions).
31. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Anti-Innovation
Bias of Tort Law 25-31 (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper
No. 07-31, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1028346. This predictability imperative also casts doubt on the utility,
at least in this specific area of regulation, of claims by proponents of "cultural
cognition" that diverse ways of understanding and assessing risk are all
presumptively if not equally legitimate and that this may justify having
separate institutions, such as tort litigation and regulatory agencies, provide
For a discussion of cultural
competing risk and liability assessments.
cognition, see Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and
Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 149 (2006).
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drug approval provisions, in contrast with some of those governing
the regulation of medical devices, do not expressly preempt state
law, 3 2 the issue is whether and to what extent the FDA's drug
safety-related decisions impliedly preempt state law.
Since
2000, 3 3 and most notably in the recent work of Sharkey, 3 4

Merrill, 35 Richard Epstein, 36 and Richard Nagareda, 3 7 leading
torts scholars have lavished much attention on this very question,
with highly interesting and illuminating results. I am largely
persuaded by their analyses and conclusions, particularly their
reasons for preferring administrative regulation to state tort law
in situations of conflict or frustration.
I shall augment their analyses in three main ways. First, like
Merrill and Sharkey, I maintain that implied preemption should
turn largely on the criterion of comparative institutional
competence as between state and federal (in diversity cases)
courts applying state products liability law, on the one side, and
the FDA's regulatory decisions concerning drug safety on the
other. 38 In support of this conclusion, however, I emphasize
certain structural features of the tort system that they largely
neglect-particularly, its relative deficiencies in informationprocessing, learning, corrigibility, and accountability.
These
weaknesses, I argue, should cause courts-absent clear statutory
language to the contrary (thus taking the case out of the implied
preemption category)-to resolve the questions that I listed two
paragraphs earlier (and perhaps others that involve court-FDA
conflicts bearing on design and warning defect claims) in favor of
32. This fact precludes the more formalistic statutory interpretation
approach favored by Richard Epstein and Michael Greve in their co-edited
book, FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS (Richard
A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007).
33. Symposium, Regulatory Compliance as a Defense to Products
Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000).
34. See Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 7 (arguing that the
FDA should have to make a prior determination of fraud before this finding
can be wielded in state courts); Sharkey, FraudCaveat, supra note 23.
35. Merrill, supra note 22.
36. Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A
Critiqueof Chevron Deference and a Response to RichardNagareda,1 J. TORT
L. art. 5 (2006), http://www.bepress.com/jtl/voll/issl/art5.
37. Nagareda, supra note 6.
38. I say "largely" because the implied preemption analysis also entails
analysis of the FDA's role under the statutory scheme.
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preemption of state tort law by relevant FDA drug safety
As discussed below, the law should also
regulatory actions.
endeavor to resolve the preemption issue as early in the litigation
as possible. The case for this pro-preemption tilt, I conjecture, will
likely be strengthened further by the Food and Drug Amendments
Act, enacted in September, 2007, which significantly expands the
FDA's authority to monitor post-approval drug safety and take
action against violations in a number of ways that are, or at least
should be, highly relevant to the resolution of the preemption
39
issue.
Second, this preemption would be a qualified or conditional
one. Like all other tort scholars, I favor an exception to both FDA
preemption of tort claims and to any state law regulatory
compliance defense that might survive this preemption: cases in
which the manufacturer fraudulently withholds from the agency
Apparently, every state
regulation-relevant risk information.
legislature that has adopted regulatory compliance provisions as a
complete defense (Michigan), 40 as a defense only to punitive
42
damages, 4 1 or some other variant, includes such an exception.
Its goal, of course, is to enhance manufacturers' incentives to
gather, analyze, and disclose all relevant risk information to the
FDA, Congress, and the public in a timely fashion.
Professor Sharkey has carefully examined the scope and
39. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
See also FDA, Law Strengthens FDA,
110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007).
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/advance/fdaaa.html (last visited Dec. 25,
2007). Among other provisions, the Amendments authorized the FDA to
require manufacturers to adopt a "risk evaluation and mitigation strategy" in
light of post-approval safety information, sec. 901(b), § 505-1, 121 Stat. at
926-38 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1); to require post-approval studies
or clinical trials in light of possible risks, sec. 901(a), § 505(o), 121 Stat. at
922-26 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355); to impose higher civil penalties for
a number of manufacturer infractions, sec. 902(b), § 303(f)(4), 121 Stat. at
943 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 333); to develop a post-marketing risk
identification and analysis system, sec. 905(a), §§ 505(k)(3)-(4), 121 Stat. at
944-49 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355); to encourage consumer reporting of
drugs' negative side-effects, sec. 906(a), § 502(n), 121 Stat. at 949-50 (to be
codified at 21 U.S.C. § 352); and to increase the frequency of reports based on
the Adverse Event Reporting System database, sec. 921, § 505(k)(5), 121 Stat.
at 962 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355).
40. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2946(5) (2000).
41. See supra note 4.
42. Sharkey, FraudCaveat, supra note 23.
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application of this fraud exception, particularly in light of the
Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs'Legal
Committee,4 3 which held that a stand-alone fraud-on-the-FDA
claim involving a regulated medical device was impliedly
preempted by the possibility that state court adjudications of
fraud would conflict with the FDA's own rules concerning the
information that the manufacturer must provide to the agency, as
well as the agency's own policing of fraud. 44 Rejecting other
possible readings of Buckman, Sharkey, like Justice Stevens in his
Buckman concurrence, would preempt tort litigation challenging
the safety of FDA-regulated products based on fraud-on-theagency, or state-based tort claims in which fraud is a critical
element, unless the FDA has made an antecedent finding that
fraud occurred in the process of obtaining (or retaining) approval
of a product or label. 45 Although such a finding could follow either
an FDA-initiated process or a citizen petition to the agency, she
does not discuss the rules that would govern the FDA's factfinding process in this "primary jurisdiction" situation. 4 6 It seems
likely, however, that such rules would entail considerable delay
and other costs that a sound preemption regime should seek to
minimize. In March 2008, an equally divided Supreme Court
failed to clarify its understanding of how Buckman will apply to a
state law (in this case, Michigan's) regulatory compliance defensecum-fraud-on-the -agency exception. 47
The best reading of Buckman's scope, I suggest, would build
on the Court's evident concerns about comparative institutional
competence between court and agency, and about the "inherently"
and "uniquely" federal interest in having the FDA control the
regulatory relationship between the manufacturer and itself
under the FDCA.48 Because the FDA's approval process for drug
43.
44.
45.
354-55
46.

531 U.S. 341 (2001).
Id. at 348-51.
Sharkey, FraudCaveat, supra note 23; see also Buckman, 531 U.S. at
(Stevens, J., concurring).
Sharkey, Fraud Caveat,supra note 23.

47. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, No. 06-1498, 2008 WL 552875 (U.S.

Mar. 3, 2008) (per curiam) (4-4 decision). Because the Court was equally
divided, it was obliged to affirm the lower court decision in Desiano v.
Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006), which denied FDA
preemption of the Michigan fraud-on-the-agency exception.
48. See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347-48.
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safety is more rigorous and comprehensive than the process for
medical devices at issue in Buckman, 49 one can infer that the
Court's concerns about the agency's regulatory primacy and ability
to police fraud apply with even greater force to drug safety
regulation. A narrower reading of Buckman, moreover, would
have the Court protecting only the FDA's interest in policing fraud
against it, yet the Court seems to speak more broadly to the need
for agency discretion in making the necessary expertise-guided,
risk-versus-risk tradeoffs among safety, efficacy, prompt consumer
access, innovation, and other desiderata. 50 Again, there is simply
no reason to think that these concerns would apply only to fraudon-the-agency claims or to medical device regulation. On the
other hand, a broad reading of Buckman might invalidate all state
laws that provide a fraud exception to preemption, a possibility
discussed shortly.
The exception that I favor, then, would be both broader and
narrower than the one proposed by Sharkey or that contained in
the Michigan statute. It would be broader in two ways. First, it
would defeat preemption not only in cases of fraud (i.e.,
intentional misrepresentation), but also in three other kinds of
cases:
(1)
negligent
misrepresentation,
(2)
innocent
misrepresentation, and (3) failure (not amounting to affirmative
misrepresentation) to inform the agency about material riskrelevant information in timely fashion. 5 1 I call these three
additional categories "non-fraud disclosure deficits."
The second way I would broaden the exception is that FDA
inaction or indecision with respect to any disclosure deficits would
not in and of itself bar plaintiffs from proceeding in tort. To be
sure, I would, with Sharkey, make an express FDA finding of
fraud automatically defeat a claim of preemption, 5 2 as such a
finding would remove the risk, so central to the Court's rationale
in Buckman, of interference by the tort litigation with the agency's
49.
50.

Nagareda, supra note 6.
See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 349-51.

51. Sharkey does note that a narrow reading of Buckman would enable
plaintiffs to easily circumvent its strictures by pleading failure-to-warn
claims based on incomplete disclosures to the FDA, Sharkey, Fraud Caveat,
supra note 23, but she does not directly discuss the fact that non-fraudulent
disclosure deficits pose the same threat to sound safety regulation that fraud
does.

52.

See id.
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own policing of manufacturer fraud. Under my proposal, however,
a preemption claim would also be defeated by an FDA finding of a
non-fraud disclosure deficit.
The exception would be narrower in that in order to survive a
motion to dismiss, the tort plaintiff would have to meet a pleading
standard requiring greater specificity with respect to both the
allegations of disclosure deficit and the supporting factual
This pleading standard should be much more
evidence.
demanding than the already heightened standard that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure currently requires for complaints alleging
53
fraud.
A third change, also building on the work of other preemption
scholars, concerns the status of a regulatory compliance defense
under state law. As noted earlier, most states do not provide for
such a defense where the manufacturer fully complies with FDA
(or other agency) regulations, and those states that do-again,
Michigan excepted-make compliance only a presumptive defense
that the plaintiff can overcome, or make it a defense only to the
imposition of punitive damages, which only rarely occurs.
Although modifying FDA preemption principles as I propose
would block (at least prima facie) many design and warning defect
claims in state courts 54 as a matter of federal law under the
Supremacy Clause, 55 there is much to be said for also effecting
this change as a non-constitutional matter under state law by
crafting a regulatory compliance defense-cum-deficit disclosure
exception along the lines discussed below. But because Buckman's
rationale may bar such a disclosure deficit exception under state
law a fortiori, federal legislation may be required, a possibility
discussed near the end of Part III.
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("Fraud or Mistake; Conditions of Mind. In

alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the

circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Mlice, intent, knowledge, and
For
other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally.").
interpretations, see United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft

Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1256-59 (D.C. Cir. 2004), and United States ex rel. Totten
v. Bombardier Corp., 286 F.3d 542, 551-52 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
54. That is, subject to plaintiffs' ability to invoke the expanded fraud
"disclosure deficit" exception that I propose and thus overcome the defense.
55. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. I put it this way because although courts

typically justify their preemption decisions as exercises in statutory
interpretation, those interpretations are influenced, if not mandated, by the
Supremacy Clause. See Merrill, supra note 22.

20081

FINDING THE SWEET SPOT

The remainder of this Article is divided into three parts,
which correspond to these three proposed reforms. Building on
the excellent recent scholarship in this vein by professors
Sharkey, Merrill, and others, Part I develops several additional
institutional-structural arguments for expanding FDA preemption
of drug safety and efficacy decisions at the expense of tort law,
arguments that I hope will advance these scholars' project of
rendering more rational and predictable the legal principles and
decision processes that shape determinations for and against FDA
preemption. Part II focuses on the so-called "fraud exception" to
FDA preemption, proposing a different conception of the proper
scope and proof of that exception. In light of the principles and
reforms defended in Parts I and II, Part III very briefly makes the
case for supplanting state tort law doctrine concerning the effect
of regulatory compliance. All three parts reflect my broad reading
of the legal policy justification for FDA preemption that the Court
advanced in Buckman. Although Buckman does not itself require
this reading, its rationale supports such an interpretation.
I. EXTENDING THE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE ANALYSIS

In new work, Merrill and Sharkey have each underscored the
normative importance of comparative institutional analysis to
sound preemption decisionmaking in the area of FDA drug safety
regulation. Their analyses are convincing, as far as they go, but
they neglect certain points of structural comparison that
supplement, and in most cases reinforce, their positions.
Merrill notes that recent federal court decisions "involve
'institutional competence writ small,' in the sense that they ask
how much weight courts should give to the views of other
institutions in resolving preemption controversies. ' 56
What
makes this fact particularly salient, he says, is that preemption
decisions primarily turn on "a discretionary judgment about the
permissible 5 7 degree of tension between federal and state law, a
question that typically cannot be answered using the tools of
56. Merrill, supra note 22 (citing Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretationand Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 938 (2003)).
57. I would add "and actual," a wholly empirical question that Merrill
would surely agree is crucial and often difficult to answer, particularly for a
court. Cf. Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 7 (noting that this
question is one about which agencies are particularly competent to answer).
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statutory interpretation." 58 Elsewhere, he inveighs against a
formalistic doctrine that conceals, or gives short shrift to, "an
evaluation of the real-world impact of" allowing state tort law to
operate concurrently with FDA regulation. 5 9 Such an evaluation,
he asserts, necessitates a systematic comparison of Congress,
agencies, and the courts with respect to certain constitutional,
60
interpretative, and pragmatic variables.
Merrill's pragmatic variables can be combined into one: the
technocratic capacity to adduce and analyze legislative facts
concerning the tradeoffs between uniformity and diversity in legal
While essential, this criterion is significantly
standards. 6 1
incomplete. Moreover, his institutional analysis, while valuable,
elides the most decisive comparison of all-between the FDA and
state courts and juries in pharmaceutical liability cases. These
flaws are analytically interrelated because both his list of
variables and his institutional analysis are designed to answer the
very same question: which institution at the federal level is best
equipped to conduct the preemption analysis? This threshold
"who shall decide" question is obviously critical, and his answer"to rely on courts as the primary institution for resolving
preemption controversies, but to augment their representational
and pragmatic capacities by drawing upon other institutions,
notably the federal agencies" 62-is convincing as far as it goes, but
it does not go far enough. Merrill makes no attempt to answer the
ultimate legal policy question in all implied preemption cases:
between the federal agency regulation and the state tort law,
which is to govern?
Professor Sharkey, on the other hand, directly analyzes and
answers both of these questions. On the "who shall decide" issue,
she proposes an "agency reference model" in which courts would
look to the relevant regulatory agency to supply them with its
expert analysis of a variety of factual issues that are, or should be,
considered in deciding the ultimate question of preemption vel
non, as well as legal interpretation issues relating to the meaning
of the regulatory statute, the nature of the agency's authority,
58.

Merrill, supra note 22.

59.
60.
6L

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.

62.
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consistency of the regulatory action in question with earlier
agency policy, and so forth. 6 3 In particular, Sharkey argues that
agencies are well-situated to find and communicate to courts the
legislative facts underlying the kind of "context-specific costbenefit (or risk-risk) analyses" that should inform the optimal
uniformity-diversity tradeoff64-a crucial factor also emphasized
by Merrill. 6 5 Drawing upon recent instances of agency-court
interactions on preemption, in which the Supreme Court has
almost invariably adopted the agency's view in products liability
cases, 66 Sharkey urges courts to exploit the agency's analytical
and policy expertise in a number of ways: such as asking agencies
to file amicus briefs, certifying questions to them, and invoking
primary jurisdiction. 67 Agency findings and recommendations, she
argues, should enjoy only Skidmore-type deference-that is,
calibrated to the court's assessment of the agency's thoroughness,
reasoning, consistency, "and all those factors which give it power
than the
to persuade, if lacking power to control" 68-rather
stronger Chevron deference, which tends to be more outcome69
determinative.
With respect to the ultimate preemption question-which
institution's law should govern a particular dispute, the agency or
state judges and juries in tort cases-Sharkey's comparative
analysis, unlike Merrill's, is directly relevant, but incomplete.
Comparing agency safety regulation with common law liability,
she begins with Professor Steven Shavell's standard law-andeconomics analysis of the optimal mix of liability and regulation,
focusing on differences in information and administrative costs,
the actual liability threat to tortfeasors, and their ability to pay

63. Sharkey, InstitutionalApproach, supranote 7.
64. Id.
65. Merrill, supra note 22.
66. See Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 7 (discussing
Medtronic, Geier, and Sprietsma). Sharkey notes that Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005), is the only exception. Id.
67. Id. See also Sharkey, Fraud Caveat, supranote 23.
68. Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 7 (quoting Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
69. Id. Like Sharkey, Merrill prefers Skidmore to Chevron deference in
the implied preemption context, but instead persuasively proposes "a sui
generis standard of review that focuses on the agency's assessment of the
practical impact of diverse state standards." Merrill, supra note 22.
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judgments. 70
She then discusses the choice between state
regulation via tort law versus federal regulation. 71 Turning to
institutional considerations that favor agency preemption
generally, she cites expertise and the advantages of a uniform
legal standard in a national market. 72 Favoring state common
law liability generally, she claims, are the importance of victim
compensation and of FDA regulatory failure or underenforcement. 7 3 Commonly added to these are the advantages of

state law diversity and experimentation, particularly if the costs

74
of this diversity can be confined to a state's own residents.
Sharkey is at some pains not to take a bottom-line position on
the ultimate preemption question of which institution's law should
govern. Her point, rather, is a more limited one: that courts
confronted with this question should employ her agency reference
model to assist them in answering it. 7 5 This is indeed an
attractive process model for courts that must decide implied
preemption claims where agnosticism on the merits of the
ultimate preemption question can best be resolved only after
reference to the agency. In the great majority of situations in
which preemption is at issue, the agency's regulatory authority is

70. See Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 7 (citing Steven
Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
357, 358-64 (1984)).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id. I discuss both of these issues infra.
74. This cost confinement is a basic assumption of Professor Stephen
Sugarman's interesting critique of Sharkey's pro-preemption analysis.
Sharkey's implicit position, he notes, is that there exists a national interest
in uniform drug safety regulation that overrides the states' possible interest
in adopting diverse tort (or even no-fault) compensation remedies for victims
even though all manufacturers would still have to comply with the uniform
FDA standard. Email from Stephen Sugarman, Professor of Law, University
of California, Berkeley School of Law, to Catherine Sharkey, Professor of
Law, New York University School of Law (Oct. 24, 2007, 11:45:00 PM) (on file
with author). Sharkey, citing with approval Merrill's axiom that "[o]ne
person's healthy regional diversity is another's interstate externality," notes
that agency expertise about the merits or demerits of diverse state common
law in such situations can and should be exploited by courts deciding
preemption issues. Email from Catherine Sharkey, Professor of Law, New
York University School of Law, to Stephen Sugarman, Professor of Law,
University of California, Berkeley School of Law (Oct. 24, 2007, 2:59:37 PM)
(on file with author).
75. Sharkey, InstitutionalApproach, supranote 7.
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neither comprehensive nor aimed at determining optimal risk. In
those situations, moreover, the institutional comparison factors,
"risk-versus-risk" considerations, 76 and policy tradeoffs may be
closely balanced enough that the expert information elicited by the
agency reference may turn out to tip the balance on the ultimate
77
preemption decision by the court.
FDA drug safety decisions, however, are significantly
different. In this narrow but exceedingly important subset of
safety regulation, the FDA exercises an authority that is probably
more comprehensive and technocratically rigorous than that
Moreover, these
exercised by any other federal regulator.
decisions reflect what appears to be the agency's best judgment
about the optimal tradeoffs of the conflicting goals and
considerations that inevitably surround such regulation. It is
true, as Sharkey has noted, that the FDA has been somewhat
inconsistent in its claims about whether its drug safety standards
seek optimal or minimum protection-whether they purport to
establish a regulatory "sweet spot" or instead a mere safety floor78
and if the former, whether they are preemptive.
Be that as it may, the FDA's current pro-preemption position
on this issue is emphatic and crystal clear, 7 9 with the agency
aggressively asserting it in a number of forms and fora.8 0 More to
76. See generally RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds.,

1995) (discussing risk-versus-risk considerations in policy analysis)
77. Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 7; see also Sharkey,
Roberts Court, supra note 18, at 5 ("[T]he products liability preemption
inquiry is multidimensional, involving layers of legal and policy issues,
beginning with interpretation of the statutory language, but reaching beyond

to issues of regulatory policy, federalism, and the level of deference accorded
federal agency actions and interpretations."). Sharkey's review of Supreme
Court case law identifies many such situations. Sharkey, Institutional
Approach, supra note 7.
78. Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 7; Sharkey, Roberts
Court, supra note 18, at 7-8.

79. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1009 (2008) (under
Skidmore and Mead, deference to the FDA's position may be reduced, but not
eliminated, by its change of position).
80. Sharkey, Roberts Court, supra note 18, at 6-8 (regulatory preambles,
amicus briefs in court cases, and official statements). The FDA's insistence
and new-found consistency, of course, do not necessarily justify its propreemption reading of its statutory authority, but courts should take due
account of its position, past and present, in deciding the scope of that
authority. See Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 7 (arguing for
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the point, its claim of optimality in the sense just described-that
its decisions reflect its judgment about the appropriate level of
safety, all things considered-is amply justified, for the reasons
just given. If any agency can be said to regulate for optimal
safety, then, it is the FDA in its drug safety program. 8 1 Needless
to say, this speaks only to the agency's regulatory goal; it in no
way implies that the agency actually attains that Goldilocks ideal
-to get the safety level "just right"-in any particular case. To be
sure, the FDA has made tragic errors in the past and doubtless
will make more in the future. Although some of these errors may
be avoidable and even negligent, others are instead in the nature
of complex decisionmaking under irreducible uncertainty and
conflicting goals. The policy-relevant questions, however, are (1)
what "error" means where regulatory decisions are fraught with so
many difficult risk-versus-risk and other tradeoffs and with
science that is so often uncertain and in flux, and (2) whether
juries are likely to do better on that score than the agency.
In the FDA drug regulation context, the institutional
competence comparison cuts strongly in favor of agency
preemption on both counts-especially with respect to pre-market
approval of pharmaceutical products and labeling. The postapproval stage, which involves different activities and
considerations, made the case for FDA preemption a closer one
before the 2007 amendments, which significantly expand FDA
authority in the post-approval period. 8 2 It remains to be seen how
this new authority-and the resources that Congress provides for
its exercise-alters the FDA's overall regulatory effectiveness.
Also relevant to this question is how the disclosure deficit
exception to preemption that I present in Part II would actually
operate.
Like me, most scholars making the FDA-tort litigation
comparison have stressed the agency's technocratic and
information-processing advantage. 8 3 Sharkey emphasizes this as
Skidmore deference); see also Epstein, supra note 36, at 3 (given the FDA's
comprehensive regulation of drug safety, even its disavowal of preemption
should not be determinative).
81. As Nagareda explains, this is not true for some aspects of the FDA's
regulation of medical devices. Nagareda, supra note 6, at 17-18.
82. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L.
No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007).
83. See, e.g., supra Part I (discussing Merrill and Sharkey).
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well in noting the FDA's ability to find and analyze contextspecific legislative facts relating to cost-benefit and risk-risk
84
These points,
tradeoffs generated by uniform FDA rules.
however, overlook deeper structural differences that support FDA
preemption even more firmly. The principal structural limitation
of FDA regulation, of course, is that it cannot directly compensate
victims of unsafe or improperly labeled drugs. For reasons that I
explain in the penultimate paragraph of this part, I view this
limitation as irrelevant to the preemption question, particularly in
light of the potentially important but carefully constrained role for
tort litigation that the disclosure deficit exception elaborated in
Part II would preserve for cases in which such a deficit
substantially undermines agency decisions.
Apart from the issue of compensation, the most important
difference between FDA regulation and state tort litigation, of
course, is that most common law decisions in pharmaceutical
design and warning defect cases are made by, or in the shadow, of
juries. Juries have many virtues: lay common sense, institutional
independence, knowledge of community standards, an unbiased
85
Unfortunately,
desire for accuracy and fairness, and others.
however, the ability to process detailed scientific research
information and complex risk-risk tradeoffs, and to make or
second-guess technocratic decisions about drug design and
86
As the Supreme Court observed in
labeling, is not among them.
84.

Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 7.

Professor Zipursky

observes, correctly, that under the existing system, a jury may have before it
a body of risk information that is superior to that which the agency had
before it when it made its decision. Email from Benjamin Zipursky, Professor
& James H. Quinn Chair, Fordham Law School, to author, Simeon E. Balwin
Professor of Law, Yale Law School (Nov. 13, 2007, 5:19:49 PM) (on file with
author). He goes on to argue that if we bar juries from deciding such cases
(except where a disclosure deficit can be shown), it is because of a liability
rule-limiting liability to the state-of-the-art when the disclosures were made
-not an institutional competence analysis. Id. I disagree. So long as the
FDA can require the manufacturer to disclose all material, relevant risk
information, both pre- and post-approval, its institutional advantages in
technocratic information and analysis remain.
85. The most recent catalogue of strengths of both criminal and civil
juries can be found in NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE
VERDICT (2007). See also VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM (Robert

E. Litan ed., 1993).
86. Indeed, savvy lawyers would probably try to use their voir dire to
exclude any potential juror who knew anything about these subjects.
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its very recent Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. decision, "[a] jury

...

sees

only the cost of a more dangerous design, and is not concerned
with its benefits; the patients who reaped those benefits are not
represented in court. ''8 7 As a practical matter, it seems most
unlikely that even the most able trial lawyers could reproduce in
the courtroom the process of FDA decisionmaking that produced
its standard; a process that is technically and politically complex,
intensively interactive, tradeoff-pervaded and highly protracted.
Yet it is hard to see how even the most conscientious and attentive
jury can accurately assess the reasonableness (for that is usually
the relevant legal standard) of the agency's regulatory product
unless it can replicate that process.
Nor is a jury even remotely accountable to political,
administrative, or technocratic controls. This built-in lack of
accountability is in sharp contrast to a regulatory agency,
particularly one whose decisions are as controversial and closelymonitored as those of the FDA in the drug safety area. The jury

answers to no one. 88 Indeed, by institutional design its general
verdicts are Delphic and inscrutable in the extreme, providing no
clues whatsoever to the facts that it found, the content of the legal
standards that it actually applied (as distinct from what the judge
instructed them to apply), or the reasoning process by which it
linked facts and standards to reach its ultimate judgment.8 9
In contrast, the FDA Commissioner is nominated by the
President and requires Senate confirmation in a process that is
sometimes quite controversial, and a few of their top-level
subordinates are political appointees and also subject to dismissal.
The FDA, and its regulation of drug safety in particular, are the
subjects of constant and often probing oversight by congressional

87.

128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008)

88. There is of course the extremely rare instance when the civil trial

judge is prepared to rule that the jury was actuated by prejudice or passion
such that no reasonable juror could have reached the verdict that was
rendered. Appellate courts, with a narrower standard of review, are even less
likely to reverse a jury's verdict.
89. Special verdicts can reduce this inscrutability somewhat by
answering specific questions of fact, but courts tend not to use them in tort
cases generally. I have no information on how often they are employed in
pharmaceutical design and warning defect disputes, but the answer is
probably seldom.
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91
the Government
staff,9 0 industry and public interest groups,
93
92
the departmental inspector general,
Accountability Office,
95
94
specialized and general media,
professional associations,

90. E.g., The Adequacy of FDA Efforts to Assure the Safety of the Nation's
Drug Supply: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations
of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter
FDA Efforts]; The Food and Drug Administration's Critical Mission and
Challenges for the Future: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Government Reform, 110th Cong. (2007).
91. See, e.g., Ephedra: Who is Protecting the American Consumers?:
Hearing Before the Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring, and
the District of Columbia Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
107th Cong. 104-111 (2002) (statement of Sidney M. Wolfe, M.D., Director,
Public Health Citizen Health Research Group); Sidney M. Wolfe et al.,
Petition to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Requesting the Ban of
Production and Sale of Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine7 Alkaloids
53
(Sept. 5, 2001), http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID= 0 .
92. E.g., Prescription Drugs, Preliminary Observations on Efforts to
Enforce the Prohibitions on Personal Importation: Testimony Before the
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
GAO-04-839T (2004) (statement of Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland
Security and Justice Issues); Internet Pharmacies,Some Pose Safety Risks for
Consumers and Are Unreliable in Their Business Practices:Testimony Before
the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, S. Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, GAO-04-888T (2004) (statement of Marcia Crosse, Director, Health
Care-Public Health and Military Health Care Issues).
93. See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, Report Assails F.D.A. Oversight of Clinical
Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007, at Al (discussing report by inspector
general of the Department of Health and Human Services that notes flaws in
FDA clinical trials).
94.

See,

e.g.,

COUNCIL

ON

SCIENTIFIC

AFFAIRS,

AMERICAN

MEDICAL

ASSOCIATION, ENHANCED PHYSICIAN ACCESS TO FDA DATA (2005),
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/15152.html#recentfda
(discussing drug safety problems and recommending enhancements to the
drug approval and postmarketing surveillance processes).
95. See, e.g., FDAnews Drug Daily Bulletin, Survey: Most Orthopedic
Specialists Want Access to Vioxx, Looser Drug Approval Process (Feb. 9,
http://www.fdanews.comlnewsletter/article?articleId=90587&issueId
2007),
=9836; FDAnews Drug Daily Bulletin, Creation of New Drug 'Regulators'
Prompted by Vioxx Verdict (Aug. 29, 2005), http://www.fdanews.com/newsl
7977
; In Wake of Vioxx Recall, FDA's
etter/article?articleId=75803&issueld=
Integrity Questioned, PHARMACEUTICAL CORP. COMPLIANCE REP., Oct. 12, 2004,
at 5, http://www.hendlerlaw.com/news/PCCR_2004-10-12.pdf; Diedtra
Henderson, FDA Rejects Vioxx-Like Painkiller,BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 28, 2007,
at B6; Alex Berenson, Plaintiffs Find Payday Elusive in Vioxx Suits, N. Y.
(Aug. 22, 2005),
TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007, at Al; CNN.com, American Morning
4
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/22/ltm.0 .html (transcript of
television broadcast discussing $229 million verdict against Merck over the
Vioxx drug).
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agency whistleblowers, 96 and other watchdogs. 97 Physicians,
prompted by their individual patients, usually learn first of
unlabeled side effects post-approval and report them to the FDA
and medical journals. This intensive scrutiny often leads to highprofile, well-publicized congressional hearings, including those
held in the current Congress by the House Oversight and
Government Reform Committee led by its aggressive, censorious
chairman, Henry Waxman, in which agency officials are called on
the carpet to publicly explain and defend their regulatory
actions. 98 Indeed, this political accountability of the FDA is in
some tension with its expertise; politics may sometimes override
or compromise the technical judgments of the agency's
professional staff, as in the case of the morning-after contraceptive
pill. 99 Even so, much that the FDA (and other agencies) does, of
course, remains undetected by outsiders until after damage is
done. 10 0 Nevertheless-and this is the key analytical point-the
96. See, e.g., Morning Edition: Lawmakers Take a Hard Look at FDA,
Drugs (NPR radio broadcast Feb. 14, 2007); FDA Efforts, supra note 90, at
90-93 (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley); Theresa Agovino, Government
Whistle-Blower to be Deposed in Vioxx Case, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.),
Mar. 16, 2006, at 46.
97. See, e.g., Peter Barton Hutt, Investigations and Reports Respecting
FDA Regulation of New Drugs (Part ), 33 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 537 (1983); Peter Barton Hutt, Investigations and Reports
Respecting FDA Regulation of New Drugs (Part II), 33 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 674 (1983).

98. E.g., Walt Bogdanich, F.D.A. is Unable to Ensure Drugs are Safe,
Panel is Told, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, at A17 (reporting testimony before
Congress regarding FDA's limited program for inspecting foreign drug
manufacturers and their products); Harris, supra note 93; Agriculture, Rural
Development, Food and Drug Administration and Related Agencies
Appropriationsfor Fiscal Year 2008: Hearing on H.R. 3191/S. 1859 Before a
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. 479-92 (2007)
(statement of Hon. Andrew Von Eschenbach, Comm'r, Food and Drug
Administration); FDA Efforts, supra note 90, at 207-40 (testimony of Andrew
C. Von Eschenbach, M.D., Comm'r, United States Food and Drug
Administration).
99. See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Gains Accord on Wider Sales of
Next-Day Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at A13 ("The [FDA] has delayed a
decision on Plan B for three years in a process that critics have said was
driven by political considerations.").
100. On criticism of FDA, see Richard A. Merrill, Compensation for
Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REV. 1, 20-28 (1973); Gina Kolata, The
F.D.A. Approves a Drug. Then What?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1997, at F1
(highlighting a leading epidemiologist's criticism of the FDA's reporting
system about drug reactions because "most doctors don't know the system
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comparison to the jury's non-accountability could hardly be more
Indeed, as Professor Sharkey points out, FDA
striking.
preemption might actually increase the agency's political
accountability. 10 1 Absent preemption, it shares responsibility for
drug safety regulation with the tort system. This enables the
safety
agency to deflect some of the public criticism of10drug
2
juries.
and
judges,
lawyers,
plaintiffs'
onto
regulation
Another important but seldom-discussed advantage of the
FDA (and of agencies more generally) when compared with
common law tort litigation is the FDA's vastly superior capacity to
learn from its environment and correct its policy mistakes in a
The common law proceeds slowly and
timely fashion.
incrementally, driven by opportunistic legal entrepreneurs who
10 3
Given
tend to act in largely uncoordinated, unsystematic ways.
the largely ad hoc nature of this gradual process, the
generalization and rationalization of common law become possible
only after a significant number of fact-specific adjudications
accumulate. Even then, it does not necessarily produce accurate
10 4
or efficient outcomes.
exists"). For examples of specific FDA errors that were detected only after

the fact, see Bruce Ingersoll, Amid Lax Regulation, Medical Devices Flood a
Vulnerable Market, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1992, at Al (discussing Orcolon's
approval despite a lead reviewer's "deep misgivings about the product" and
its withdrawal after thirty-three patients had to undergo an additional
surgical procedure because of complications that risked their vision); Teresa
Moran Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 1335, 1350 (1992) ("Tampon [l]abeling for toxic shock syndrome was
delayed some twenty months because the FDA chose to rely first on voluntary
standards by the industry (although the standards were not universally
adopted) instead of issuing a rule requiring the labeling.").
101. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble,supra note 17, at 252-53.
102. See id. (discussing arguments to this effect by Lars Noah and Peter
Huber).
103. Very occasionally, visionary reformers do fashion a more selfconsciously strategic and long-term litigation campaign. The litigation
strategy that led to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), is of
course the most notorious example. In addition, litigators often think
strategically in deciding which cases to settle and which to take to trial. See,
e.g., George L Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257, 257-86 (1974).
104. Compare Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80
Geo. L.J. 583 (1992), with Priest & Klein, supra note 103, and Ehrlich &

Posner, supra note 103.
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Moreover, courts tend to decide whatever disputes the
litigation process, directed by these legal entrepreneurs, happens
to deliver to them at the particular time, and they do so largely in
the order in which the cases are filed. This severe constraint
affords individual judges little opportunity to take the kind of
synoptic view that might enable them to guide the law in a
systemically rational direction.

When one adds to this the fact

that tort adjudication is radically decentralized among thousands
of trial judges, loosely coordinated by multiple appellate panels in
dozens of decidedly independent jurisdictions, one can see how
exiguous the common law's learning capacities are and how

limited and sporadic are its opportunities to rectify a wrong turn
in the law once a judge happens to detect it. These conditions do
not vary much with the quality of litigators or the clairvoyance of
judges. Instead, they are deeply structural and fundamentally

constitutive of common law adjudication. 10 5

Agencies are very different in each of these respects.

In

principle, and to a considerable degree in practice, agencies can
self-consciously shape and signal their policy intentions, learn
about the consequences of alternative courses of action both in
advance and after the fact, and make adjustments to rectify their
mistakes. Because the feedback loop from the regulatory
environment is relatively short and responsive, and because they
possess the power to issue rules and the instruments to
implement them, agencies can-for better or worse-effect change
far more quickly and systematically than the common law courts.
In these respects, they are essentially regulatory monopolists in
their particular domains. 106
105. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION 128-130
(2005), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND-MG1
62.pdf (discussing the compensation, deterennce, and individualized
treatment deficiencies in asbestos ligitation); see also id. at 127 ("Plaintiffs
with the same injuries and economic losses receive widely varying amounts,

depending on the skills and incentives of the attorneys representing them,
the jurisdictions in which their cases are brought and, perhaps, their own
"attractiveness" as potential trial witnesses.").
106. There are a few examples of multiple and overlapping regulators at
the federal level, most notably those that regulate banks. See, e.g., Elizabeth
F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum-Out of Many, One: Why the United States Needs
a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 1, 26 (2005)
("Over the past sixty years, many commentators have noted the problems
created by having multiple state and federal financial regulators and have
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Professors Robert Rabin and Richard Nagareda mention
"information updating" concerning drug-related risks as a
putative benefit of tort litigation. 10 7 This benefit is especially
important to the extent that the FDA fails to effectively monitor
post-approval risk information and incorporate that information
into its labeling and other regulatory decisions. No doubt there
are examples of tort litigation "eliciting information about risk
and aberrant conduct," as Rabin puts it;108 the tobacco litigation,
he notes, is probably the best example of plaintiffs' lawyers
unearthing this vital information.' 0 9 But as I explained earlier in
my discussion of accountability, FDA regulation of drug risks is
subject to many monitoring institutions, both specialized and
generic, other than tort law. In this specific area, it would be
surprising indeed if lay plaintiffs' lawyers originated this
information-as distinguished from marshalling and shaping
information unearthed by others into more focused, tendentious
forms for litigation purposes. According to one analysis, this was
indeed the case in the Vioxx and other recent litigations that are
often cited by opponents of FDA preemption as instances of FDA
regulatory failure. 110
called for the consolidation of the regulators at the federal level."); Heidi
Mandanis Schooner, Recent Challenges to the Persistent Dual Banking
System, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 263, 264 (1996) ("Archaic, arcane, or simply

bizarre, the dual banking system-which allows a bank to be chartered and
supervised by either federal or state authorities-is here to stay.").
107. Nagareda, supra note 6, at 5-6, 22; Robert L. Rabin, Keynote Paper:
Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEo L.J. 2049, 2068-70 (2000).
108. Rabin, supra note 107, at 2068.
109. Id. at 2069-70. In support of his position, Rabin cites my own
analysis of mass torts. Id. at 2069 n.86 (citing Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts:
An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 941, 951-53
(1995)). But my analysis concerned mass torts for products or pollution that
is not comprehensively regulated for optimal safety. Indeed, Rabin himself
notes that even in the case of tobacco, the litigation contributed essentially no
new information about the risks of smoking. Robert L. Rabin, The Third
Wave of Tobacco Tort Litigation, in REGULATING TOBACCO 176, 202 (Robert L.
Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001).
110. Anita Bernstein argues that plaintiffs' lawyers have not contributed
much new risk information in the Vioxx litigation or indeed since the Dalkon
Shield litigation. Bernstein, supra note 16, at 1055. Whether Vioxx is an
instance of regulatory failure or not is debatable. More than two-thirds of the
cases that went to trial found no liability, and the pending settlement
agreement, despite its $4.85 billion price tag, is widely viewed both as a
vindication of Merck's position and of the high transaction costs of mass tort
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The question for our purposes, however, is not whether this
lawyering function is socially valuable-it clearly can be-but
whether it is more or less redundant of the many other monitoring
and accountability institutions that are already performing it, or if
not, whether they can be equipped and induced to perform it
better than they have in the past. This is ultimately an empirical
question, which more case studies would illuminate. The 2007
amendments to the FDCA should improve the FDA's performance
in this respect, 111 thus reducing the value of whatever marginal
contribution tort litigation has made to this function.
I noted earlier that some courts and commentators like Rabin
have emphasized that the FDCA does not provide a compensatory
remedy for those injured by defective products and warnings.
From this fact, they erroneously conclude that a tort judgment
applying different standards of conduct than the FDA either does
not constitute a form of regulation, much less one that can be
inconsistent with that of the agency, or does regulate but only as a
necessary aspect of tort's primary compensatory function.
Professor Rabin, for example, argues that the tort system is a
necessary complement to FDA regulation because tort can fill the
"compensation gap" for injured plaintiffs. 112 But if Congress has
authorized the FDA to determine the socially optimal level of drug
safety and information, taking all other risk-relevant factors into
account, then a properly labeled, duly-approved drug is not in fact
defective. 1 13 If this is so, no jury should be permitted to render a
verdict that creates incentives to market that drug and label in a
different form. In that case, no wrong has been committed and
litigation. See Alex Berenson, Merck is Said to Agree to Pay $4.85 Billion for
Vioxx Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007, at Al. On the other side, some juries
have assessed large damages against Merck. The most important was a
Texas jury verdict in 2005 for $253 million in compensatory and punitive
damages. See Alex Berenson, Jury Calls Merck Liable in Death of Man on
Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2005, at Al.
111. See supra note 39.
112. Rabin, supra note 107, at 2073. Sharkey refers to this as a "remedial
void." Sharkey, InstitutionalApproach, supra note 7.
113. As the Court recently put it in a case of an express preemption
provision, "the solicitude for those injured by FDA-approved devices ... was
overcome in Congress's estimation by solicitude for those who would suffer
without new medical devices if juries were allowed to apply the tort law of
[fifty] [s]tates to all innovations." Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999,
1009 (2008)
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thus compensation based on fault principles is simply
inappropriate. 1 4 Even if one were to conclude that Congress has
not yet authorized the FDA to regulate for optimal safety, the
analysis in this part strongly suggests that Congress should
change (or clarify) the FDCA to do precisely that.
Based on comparative institutional competence grounds, then,
I do not share Professor Sharkey's agnosticism as to whether FDA
115
drug safety regulation should preempt state tort litigation subject to the disclosure deficit exception discussed in Part 11-nor
do I see much marginal value in adding an agency reference
process that (in this situation, not in others) would simply
increase uncertainty, delay, and cost, while yielding agency views
about an ultimate preemption decision that is (and should be)
over-determined on these grounds. When agencies set out to
regulate, they need to know what, how, and with what effect they
can do so, particularly if they are to justify the confidence that
Sharkey thinks courts should have in them. Yet the prospect of
114. In principle, this need not leave uncompensated those consumers who
are injured by drugs that fully comply with FDA requirements. If Congress
wishes to compensate those harmed by FDA-compliant drugs, it could
establish a no-fault compensation system.
Professor Sugarman goes so far as to suggest that a state could use its
tort law to impose strict liability on drug manufacturers-thus fulfilling the
compensation function-so long as this liability does not alter or interfere
with a manufacturer's obligation to comply with the FDA's labeling and other
requirements. Email from Stephen Sugarman, Professor of Law, University
of California, Berkeley School of Law, to author, Simeon E. Baldwin
Professor, Yale Law School (Jan. 7, 2008, 12:39 PM) (on file with author).
I doubt, however, that Sugarman's scheme would-or should-survive
under a preemption rule. One simply cannot separate the compensation and
regulatory issues without affecting drug manufacturer incentives in ways
that are difficult to predict and that involve the highest social stakes. The
prospect of having to pay compensation under a strict liability rule, especially
one not subject to a state-of-the-art defense, would surely increase the
already large uncertainty that surrounds manufacturers' large long-term
investments that are necessary in order to develop socially valuable
pharmaceutical products. It might also cause risk-averse manufacturers to
include more in their labeling than would be optimal for consumers.
Professor Merrill also raises a question about the legality of state-legislated
programs of this kind. Email from Thomas Merrill, Professor of Law, to
author, Simeon E. Baldwin Professor, Yale Law School (Nov. 14, 2007) (citing
Goodyear Atomic v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988) (government argued that
state workers compensation award would be preempted if tort liability would
be preempted)) (on file with author).
115. Sharkey, InstitutionalApproach, supra note 7.
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state-level common law "regulation" produces precisely the
opposite effects. On the other side, claimants, their lawyers, and
the state courts need to know the implied preemption rules so that
they can wisely allocate their scarce litigation and adjudication
resources.
If I am correct about this, then there is much to be gained - in
terms of legal clarity, predictability, transparency, and
administrative cost-from adopting a categorical implied
preemption rule in this area. The rationale for this rule, however,
depends on the FDA being fully informed about the risks
associated with the drug and its ability to vigorously enforce the
law on the basis of that information. This rule and its scope, then,
must be subject to a carefully designed "disclosure deficit"
exception that can assure that this condition actually exists, an
exception to which I now turn. I discuss the enforcement issue in
the Conclusion.
II.

DESIGNING A DISCLOSURE DEFICIT EXCEPTION TO

FDA

PREEMPTION

Any federal rule providing for FDA preemption of common
law claims of drug warning and design defect must have an
exception for situations in which manufacturers or others who are
under a legal duty to supply accurate drug risk information to the
agency fail to do so. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, of state
laws providing for a regulatory compliance defense. The basic
rationales are, first, that manufacturers and other regulated
entities typically have much better and cheaper access to risk
information than the FDA in the first instance; second, that the
FDA depends on this information for optimal safety regulation;
and third, that the regulatory standard might have been different
(usually more stringent) had the FDA been so informed. It
follows, then, that the law should create strong incentives for
entities that seek regulatory benefits, such as pre-marketing or
post-marketing approval or immunity, to disclose whatever
regulation-relevant risk information they possess (or in some
formulations, information that they should have obtained). The
"fraud exception," as it is usually called, is designed to create
these incentives, while the hyper-heightened pleading standard
proposed below is designed to prevent that exception from
swallowing the preemption rule.
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All scholars who tackle the subjects of implied agency
preemption or regulatory compliance favor some version of a state
common law or statutory fraud exception. 1 16 Because the FDA's
regulatory approval is negated by a finding-by the agency, or by
a court whose finding is binding on the agency-of fraud on the
FDA, it would seem that no additional federal law regulatory
fraud exception is needed. 117 Nevertheless, Professor Sharkey,
who has analyzed this exception most closely and recently, notes
that it has been under-theorized, 1 18 which surprises her (and me)
precisely because so much in the FDA preemption debate turns on
it.
Perhaps for this reason, the Supreme Court recently took up
the question-indecisively, as it turned out--of whether and to
what extent the Buckman decision, which preempted a standalone fraud-on-the-FDA claim (there, involving a medical device,
not a drug) because of the federal interest in controlling the
policing of fraud against the agency, also preempted the fraud
exception in the Michigan statute's otherwise absolute regulatory
compliance defense. 119 If the Court takes a broad view of the
kinds of exceptions preempted by its earlier Buckman rationale,
then establishing the kind of "disclosure deficit" exception to
preemption that I shall now propose can only be accomplished by
federal statute. This possibility is discussed near the end of Part
116. Sharkey, FraudCaveat, supra note 23; Nagareda, supra note 6, at 4647 ("[A] showing of ... fraud should suffice to defeat the preemptive effect
that a given FDA assessment of a device or drug otherwise might have on
garden-variety actions for product liability."); Lars Noah, Rewarding
Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in Products Liability, 88
GEO. L.J. 2147, 2161-62 (2000) (fraud); Rabin, supra note 107, at 2076-79,
2082 (noting the dangers of a complete regulatory compliance defense).
Where the regulatory statute prescribes for express preemption, as with some
medical devices, the preemption will ordinarily be limited by statutory
provisions that either provide for a fraud exception, or that impose other civil
or criminal sanctions for failure to disclose risk information to the agency.
See 21 U.S.C. § 332 (2000) (injunctive relief); id. § 333(a) (criminal penalties);

21 U.S.C. § 333(g)(1)(A) (Supp. V 2001-2006) (civil penalties); 21 U.S.C. §
334(a)(2)(D) (2000) (seizing the device).
117. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (2000) (authorizing withdrawal of approval of a
new drug application); id. § 360e(e)(1) (authorizing withdrawal of approval of
a premarket approval application); id. § 360j(g)(5) (authorizing withdrawal of
approval of an investigational device exemption).
118. Sharkey, Fraud Caveat, supranote 23.
119. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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III.
In my view, the rationales for an exception to FDA
preemption extend well beyond the instances of intentional
misrepresentation that other commentators have found to
warrant a fraud exception. These rationales also militate in favor
from FDA preemption
of three
additional exceptions
corresponding to the three other kinds of disclosure deficits: (1)
negligent misrepresentation, (2) innocent misrepresentation, and
(3) failure (not amounting to an affirmative misrepresentation) to
inform the agency in a timely fashion about material risk-relevant
information. Note that these disclosure deficits would not affect
the substantive liability rule (e.g., strict liability, negligence, or
some other standard) to which the manufacturer would be held if
the tort litigation proceeds. Instead, these deficits are meant to be
relevant only to the threshold question of whether such a claim is
preempted in the first instance.
These three exceptions would apply so long as the disclosure
deficit could materially affect any decisions by the agency or by
physicians and consumers whose decisions on risk depend on the
accuracy and timeliness of this information. Such decisions would
include, among others, the following: (a) those concerning the
FDA's initial approval, labeling, and advertising of the product; (b)
the FDA's post-approval monitoring of the product in the market;
(c) possible changes in the product's labeling and advertising as
the FDA learns more about the product's uses and effects; and (d)
any off-label uses by physicians and consumers of which the
manufacturer knew or should have known had it diligently
120
searched for information about such uses.
The rationale for a broader disclosure deficit exception follows
almost logically from the rationale for the existing fraud
exception. FDA regulatory preemption of tort law is based on the
strong assumption that the quality of the agency's risk-related
decisions concerning the drug depends upon the manufacturer's
timely disclosure to the FDA of all material risk informationdefined as information that could reasonably be expected to affect

120. The FDA is reportedly developing new regulations on how
manufacturers should inform doctors and the agency about off-label uses.
Anna Wilde Mathews, FDA and DrugMarketing, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2007, at
A9.
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those agency decisions 12 1-that the manufacturer, under existing
law, should have transmitted to the agency during the approval
process and as long as the drug remains on the market. Of course,
fraud on the FDA by a manufacturer 122 is the most obvious and
egregious violation of this assumption, but the informational
assumption underlying the rationale equally fails if the
misrepresentation to the agency is negligent or innocent, or if the
manufacturer simply fails to disclose the legally-mandated
information in circumstances that do not constitute an affirmative
To extend the exception to these three
misrepresentation.
additional categories of non-disclosure would not increase the
burden on manufacturers to gather and report risk-related
information that they are required to transmit under existing
law. 123 Nor would it deprive them of any other defenses to
liability that they may possess. The only question is whether
their failure to disclose all requisite information, for whatever
reason, should vitiate preemption in these situations as well as in
instances of fraud. I believe that it should.
A danger exists, however, with respect to all of these
exceptions. Under the modern system of notice pleading, it is all
too easy to allege fraud, non-fraudulent misrepresentation, or nondisclosure
of material
facts-and
indeed
all of them
simultaneously. Unless the rules for pleading these torts are
121. FDA regulations define a statement of material fact as
[A] representation that tends to show that the safety or effectiveness
of a device is more probable than it would be in the absence of such
a representation. A false affirmation or silence or an omission that
would lead a reasonable person to draw a particular conclusion as to
the safety or effectiveness of a device also may be a false statement
of material fact, even if the statement was not intended by the
person making it to be misleading or to have any probative effect.
21 C.F.R. § 814.3(i) (2007). The term "material fact" also appears elsewhere
in the FDA regulations. E.g., id. § 314.125(b)(7); id. § 314.127(a)(13); id. §
314.150(a)(2)(iv) (2007).
122. While the manufacturer is the typical culprit in cases of fraud, other
actors may participate in the fraud as well. See, e.g., Wawrzynek v.
Statprobe, Inc., No. 05-1342, 2007 WL 3146792, at *1-4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25,
2007) (fraud by both the research firm overseeing the clinical trial and the
manufacturer); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 343
(2001) (fraud by manufacturer's consulting company).
123. For postmarking reporting requirements, see 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(2)
(2007) (annual reports); id. § 314.81(b)(1) (field alert reports); id. § 314.80
(adverse event reporting); 71 Fed. Reg. 6281 (Feb. 7, 2006) (same).
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more demanding than usual, a plaintiff can defeat one of the
principal purposes of preemption-avoiding costly litigation under
state law in situations in which uniform federal law should apply
non-fraudulent
fraudulent
or
-simply
by
alleging
misrepresentation or non-disclosure. 12 4 Rule 9(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure recognizes this problem with respect to
fraud, requiring that the circumstances allegedly constituting
fraud be pleaded "with particularity."'12 5 But the reasoning in the
previous paragraph implies that if this need for particular
pleading is true of fraud, it should be equally true of nonfraudulent disclosure deficits. 12 6 In all of these cases, the central
problem is the same: the manufacturer failed to provide the FDA
with legally-mandated risk information that was material to its
regulatory decision. To deny such a manufacturer a preemption
safe harbor that is premised on compliance with legally-mandated
It also strengthens the
disclosure follows logically.
to fully meet its disclosure
manufacturer's incentives
27
obligations.1
Indeed, this analysis suggests that the pleading standard in
For example, a
such cases should be "hyper-heightened."
plaintiffs mere allegations that the agency misinterpreted the
results of existing tests or failed to require or conduct other tests
should not suffice. He must show, at the threshold, that he is
likely to prove that the agency violated the law in ways that place
its presumed expertise with regard to such testing substantially in
124. In the antitrust context, the Supreme Court has recently emphasized

the need for more particularized pleadings. See Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 127
There is much to be said, however, for
S. Ct. 1955, 1964-67 (2007).
heightening pleading requirements in particular areas of litigation by statute

or through the process of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000),
rather than by judicial decision. I am indebted to David Shapiro for this
point.
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see also Nagareda, supra note 6, at 52.
126. This pleading rule should apply not only to tort plaintiffs but also to
those who petition the FDA to act against alleged fraud or non-fraudulent
misrepresentation or non-disclosure. However, this should not alter the very
broad, if not complete, discretion that agencies typically enjoy about whether

to act upon such petitions. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438,
1459 (2007) (judicial review of refusals to promulgate rules "is 'extremely
limited' and 'highly deferential"' (citing Nat'l Customs Brokers & Forwarders
Ass'n of Am. v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989))).
127. Nagareda proposes to augment these incentives with additional
information-forcing rules. Nagareda, supra note 6, at 42-50.
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doubt.128 Were the plaintiff to satisfy this "hyper-heightened"
pleading rule, the burden would then shift to the manufacturer to
show that the exception to preemption nonetheless does not apply.
As Sharkey persuasively argues, courts are well-advised to
look to the FDA for advice on the factual and policy questions on
which their preemption decision should turn.1 2 9 And as the
Supreme Court noted in Buckman, and as Sharkey demonstrates,
the FDA is generally better equipped than the courts to inform
and analyze such questions, especially the question of whether a
disclosure deficit has occurred.1 30 An agency finding one way or
the other should be dispositive of the preemption issue: if it finds
such a deficit, the tort litigation can proceed.1 3 1 If not, the
litigation cannot proceed-unless the plaintiff alleges harm based
on something other than an allegation that the agency approved a
product or label based on inadequate or incorrect information. If
the agency, having notice of the disclosure deficit allegations, fails
to make a timely finding one way or the other-perhaps because it
perceives more pressing regulatory priorities or because its own
investigation of the allegations is still pending-then the situation
Once a reasonable period of time for agency
is different.
investigation has elapsed without an agency determination on the
disclosure deficit issue, plaintiffs should be permitted to proceed

128. For example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
which amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, toughened the pleading
standard for private securities litigation. See Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 746-47 (1995). Complaints
alleging that the defendant made a false statement of material fact or failed
to state a material fact must "specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an
allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and
belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that
belief is formed." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2000). Furthermore, the plaintiff
must, "with respect to each act or omission[,] ... state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000). If these requirements are not
met, the complaint will be dismissed. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A) (2000).
129. Sharkey, InstitutionalApproach, supra note 7.
130. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S 341, 348-51 (2001)
(discussing how allowing state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims would frustrate
the agency's statutory power to punish and deter fraud against it); Sharkey,
InstitutionalApproach, supra note 7.
131. Such a finding would obviate the need for the hyper-heightened
pleading requirement proposed in the previous paragraph.
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with their claims, albeit subject to the hyper-heightened pleading
standard. Thus, agency inaction or indecision on the issue should
leave potential plaintiffs no worse off than they would have been
otherwise, such as if the FDA had not taken cognizance of the
deficit issue.
Merrill observes that this proposal would encourage
manufacturers to seek some sort of early ruling by the FDA that
they had complied with all of their disclosure obligations, a ruling
that the agency might or might not be prepared to provide at any
particular point in time. 132 The industry, he speculates, might
press Congress to provide more resources to enable the agency to
respond to such requests, which in turn might "reverse some of
the current regulatory pathologies, where FDA has very broad
authority but insufficient resources." 133 Alternatively, Congress
might want to prevent the agency from providing such advance
assurances, perhaps on the theory that the absence of such
assurances would induce manufacturers to err on the side of
greater disclosure rather than less. 1 34 In either event, the full
disclosure issue would be front-and-center, as it should be.
If preemption does apply, the issue of whether the
manufacturer satisfied its disclosure obligation should be
resolved, at least preliminarily, at the threshold of the litigation
on a motion to dismiss or, more likely, on a motion for summary
judgment. Where FDA preemption properly applies, defendants
should not be obliged to engage in protracted discovery and
litigation in order to establish that fact. 135 Unfortunately, this is
132. E-mail from Thomas Merrill, Professor of Law, to author, Simeon E.

Baldwin Professor, Yale Law School (Nov. 14, 2007, 11:42:46 AM) (on file
with author).
133. Id. In commenting on my proposal, Peter Barton Hutt, a former FDA
General Counsel, casebook author on FDCA law, and lawyer for drug
companies, warns that even a hyper-heightened pleading rule can easily be
satisfied by creative plaintiffs lawyers and will leave manufacturers too
vulnerable to specious liability claims and that they will respond with more
"defensive testing" that will reduce the flow of beneficial drugs. This warning
suggests the importance of very careful and tactically-sophisticated drafting
of the disclosure deficit exceptions and pleading standard.
134. Because over-disclosure carries its own costs, both to the
manufacturer and to the FDA, one would want to balance them against the
likely benefits of fortifying the manufacturer's existing incentives to disclose.
135. There is a strong analogy to the desirability of threshold
determinations of qualified and absolute immunity defenses in actions
seeking to impose liability for damages on individual government officials.

2008]

FINDING THE SWEET SPOT

more easily said than done. In practice, invoking an exception
triggered by any of these types of disclosure deficits will often
require proof of facts likely to be both energetically controverted
by the parties and subject to conflicting interpretations.
In order for a court to decide such potentially dispositive facts
at the threshold of the litigation, it may have to hear and interpret
136
It may also
testimonial evidence and resolve inconsistencies.
specific
more
the
to
have to allow some limited discovery pursuant
allegations required by the proposed pleading standard, or at least
require substantial evidence that discovery will likely yield such
Only then will it be in a position to determine the
facts.
availability of the exceptions in such cases and hence the
applicability of preemption. Doing so may require the court to
conduct a mini-trial on the factual allegations; if the facts are
complex, such a trial may not be so "mini." On the other hand, of
course, courts routinely conduct such fact-finding when called
upon to decide motions for preliminary injunctions and other
potentially dispositive threshold issues that require them to
resolve questions of fact before a full trial.
III.

THE REGULATORY COMPLIANCE DEFENSE UNDER STATE TORT LAW

The discussion so far has been concerned almost entirely with
the federal law of preemption. State law has made its appearance
here largely with respect to common law claims for design and
warning defects, which may or may not be preempted, as a matter
of federal law, by reason of FDA drug safety regulation. Professor
Sharkey estimates that roughly half of these are being adjudicated
13 7
with many of them
as diversity cases in the federal courts,
See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1773 n.2 (2007) ("Qualified

immunity is 'an immunity from suit' rather than a mere defense to liability;
and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously
permitted to go to trial."' (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526
(1985)).
136. As Sharkey notes, courts that apply a strong presumption against
preemption elide the need to engage in much fact-finding. Email from
Catherine Sharkey, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, to
author, Simeon E. Baldwin Professor, Yale Law School (Oct. 9, 2007, 09:18:51
AM)(on file with author).
137. Sharkey, Federalism in Action, supra note 15, at 1014 n.4 (quoting
Thomas H. Cohen, Do Federal and State Courts Differ in How They Handle
Civil Trial Litigation: A Portrait of Civil Trials in State and Federal District
Courts 18 (2d Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Paper, 2006),
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having been removed from state courts. 138 She finds that federal
and state courts differ in their interpretations and applications of
preemption doctrine, with the former being more likely to find
preemption.139 Even more interesting is her finding that "state
courts, which by and large have previously rejected any absolute
regulatory compliance defense .. . are now willing to entertain

preemption arguments, even if not at the same level as federal
courts' affinity for such claims . ... ,140 Nevertheless, these
changes still leave an unacceptably large amount of uncertainty
and conflict in an area in which greater uniformity is vital. 141
As noted earlier, a complete regulatory compliance defensethe state tort doctrine counterpart of FDA preemption--exists
only in Michigan, and even there, its effect on preemption remains
uncertain.142 If my analysis in Part I is correct, however, every
other state should adopt the defense, along with the disclosure
deficit exception and the hyper-heightened pleading requirement
discussed in Part II. Realistically, the probability that the states
will adopt it seems low.
Moreover, state variation and
experimentation, often a virtue in other areas, is decidedly
unwelcome in the particular context of comprehensive FDA drug
regulation.
This danger of diverse state rules governing these matters,
coupled with the superiority of FDA preemption demonstrated in
Part II,
implies that federal law should mandate FDA preemption
under these conditions. This mandate can be accomplished either
through courts' case-by-case preemption decisions or by federal
statute.
Sharkey's analysis, including her critique of the
availableat http://ssrn.com/abstratct=912691.
138. Id. at 1015 n.4.
139. Id. at 1017-18.
140. Id. at 1019.
141. The need for uniform regulation of drug research and safety is likely
to increase in the future, as the industry moves in new directions that would
be stifled by conflicting regulatory regimes. See, e.g., Andrew Pollak, Drug

Makers Seek Clues to Side Effects in Genes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2007, at C3

(discussing how pharmaceutical companies formed a new group to develop
genetic tests for determining which patients will suffer adverse side effects
from drugs in order "to cut costs and increase their success rates in
developing medications").
142. The recent Supreme Court case, Warner-Lambert Co., LLC v. Kent,
No. 06-1498, 2008 WL 552875 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2008) (per curiam) (4-4 decision),
failed to clarify the issue.
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traditional "presumption against preemption" as applied to FDA
drug regulation, 143 amply demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the
case-by-case approach due to the courts' divergent approaches to
the issue. 144 Even if this were not so, the protracted process that
would be necessary to effectuate convergence, not to mention
universal state adoption, argues strongly for a federal statute,
crafted along the lines of my proposal in Part II, to cover those
14 5
situations not already preempted by the reasoning in Buckman.
Furthermore, even an unmistakably clear holding (or dictum) by
the Supreme Court that FDA regulation of drug safety
categorically preempts design and warning defect claims might
still leave uncertain the precise contours of a disclosure deficit
exception.
A final consideration also argues strongly in favor of effecting
my proposal by enacting a federal statute. If the Supreme Court
eventually holds that its rationale in Buckman bars any fraud
exception-perhaps on the ground that any such exception would
interfere with the agency's own policing of fraud, interference that
146
-then the exception proposed
Buckman insisted on preempting
a fortiori because it would
invalid
as
seen
be
in Part II might
extend the exception beyond fraud to include negligent and
innocent disclosure deficits. A new federal statutory foundation
for this broader exception to preemption would defeat any
constitutional objection to the exception under the Supremacy
Clause.
Congress, then, should define the contours of the disclosure
deficit exception. Doing so, after all, entails a number of legal
policy considerations and tradeoffs that the Court is not wellequipped to make. These considerations include, among others:
possible distinctions among different types of disclosure deficits;
the role of state tort law in defining those categories; the precise
definition of "materiality"; standards of pleading and proof;

143.

Sharkey,

Institutional Approach, supra note

7 ("Where

the

presumption is invoked by courts, an anti-preemption determination is close
at hand.").
144. Id.. This ineffectiveness is evident in the recent Vermont decision,
Levine v. Wyeth , No. 2004-384, 2006 WL 3041078 (Vt. Oct. 27, 2006), cert.
granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008).
145. See discussion of Buckman, supratext at notes 43-50.
146. The Court will have an opportunity to do so in Levine.
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limitations periods on actions by claimants and the FDA; the
FDA's own role in interpreting and applying the exception; the
important practice of off-label uses; 14 7 procedures for dealing with
drugs already on the market whose approvals are found to have
been tainted by these deficits; and so forth. Doubtless, Congress
would find it politically difficult to perform this task, but it seems
much less contentious than in other areas such as tax policy,
immigration, and entitlement reform where it must ultimately
resolve important conflicting interests that surround pressing
public issues.
CONCLUSION

No analysis of FDA preemption should be concluded without
some reference to the 800-pound gorilla in the room: what
Sharkey calls the "enforcement void" associated with FDA drug
safety regulation.148
Many critics denounce the agency's
enforcement activity as lax and inadequate; some go so far as to
claim that the regulated industries have "captured" it, often
invoking public choice analysis. 14 9 Some analysts maintain that if
anything, the incentives of agency officials actually lead to safety
standards that are too high, not too low: politically and
psychologically, the argument goes, the personal and political
risks to officials of allowing a dangerous drug (e.g., Thalidomide)
to reach the market are greater than the same risks in the event
that a good one is not approved, while society's interests are just
the reverse. 150 A recent report by some of the FDA's scientific
advisors suggests that the agency's performance, hobbled by a
chronic inadequacy of resources relative to its public health
147. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. The related problem of
off-label promotion also involves complex tradeoffs. For favorable views of
off-label uses, see Epstein, supra note 36, at 30-31 (off-label uses are
desirable supplements to "[t]he sclerotic approval process"); Scott Gottlieb,
Stop the War on Drugs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2007, at A21 (off-label promotion
facilitates off-label use, which in turn often saves lives).
148. See Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 7.
See also
discussion of the "remedial void" supra Part I.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 90-98.
150. E.g., PETER BARTON Hurr ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAw (3d ed. 2007);
Epstein, supra note 36, at 4-5 (FDA effectiveness review is costly and delays
drug innovation, which ultimately harms consumers as long as the drug is
"erroneously kept off the market"); id. at 32-33 (arguing that legal regulation
impedes product innovation).
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15 1
Exactly
responsibilities, continues to warrant serious criticism.

where the balance of competing official incentives lies is a vitally
important question, of course, but the crucial question is,
"compared to what?"
No one can doubt that the FDA's current enforcement
capacities are deficient. Unfortunately, only Congress can remedy
these deficiencies by equipping the agency with the information,
authority and resources necessary to perform its regulatory tasks
better. One hopes that the 2007 amendments, if properly funded
and monitored for effectiveness, will significantly improve the
quality of the FDA's performance, particularly with respect to
safety-relevant information that arises only during the critical
post-approval period. 1 52 And to the extent that these changes still
do not provide the agency with enough timely and accurate risk
information, the deficit disclosure exception to preemption
proposed in Part II should further minimize the probability of
regulatory error caused by manufacturers' inadequate transmittal
of legally-mandated information.
In any event, there is simply no reason to think that state tort
juries that are invited to second-guess the FDA's safety
determinations can improve them or produce better outcomes.
Part I suggests precisely the opposite. The overriding policy goal
of promoting public health by encouraging the private investment
necessary to develop optimally safe life- and health-preserving
drugs is more likely to be attained by a system in which liability
risks depend on preemptive, authoritative decisions made by a
single, politically accountable expert agency, rather than by a nonsystem in which a multitude of lay state court juries wield
different and notoriously opaque standards 15 3 that can be
deciphered, if at all, only after a long course of litigation. The
proposal advanced in Part II is designed to ensure that the FDA is

151.

Peter Barton Hutt, The State of Science at the Food and Drug

Administration, in FDA
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B-1
B-i,
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A12.
152. See supranote 39.
153. See discussion regarding general verdicts supra Part I.
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adequately informed.' 5 4 Only Congress and an aroused and
vigilant public can ensure that the agency is adequately funded
and highly motivated to pursue effective enforcement in the public
interest.

154. The disclosure deficit exception discussed supra Part II is designed to
assure this condition.

